The Russo-Ukraine War: Three Years On

I've written reflections about the war at each anniversary since I started this particular blog. I'll let those posts speak for themselves. Ukrainians continue to hold the line, and up until the last few weeks, a US-led alliance has been instrumental in providing material support as Ukrainians defend themselves from Russian invaders. The Russian army has continued to do the only thing it knows how to do, which is to send in waves of poorly trained troops to the front lines and otherwise drop enough bombs to level whole villages, towns, and cities in the Donbas region. Russia has seen degradation of its available equipment, and is definitely strained economically. This year also saw Russia pull in North Korean troops into its continued invasion. 

Perhaps the most audacious event from the last year was Ukraine's invasion of Russia's Kursk oblast, which borders Ukraine's Sumy oblast. A lot of the drone attacks on the Sumy oblast originate from Kursk, so in a sense, I can see how a counter-invasion of Kursk has utility insofar as it takes Kursk out of play and to the extent that it has further exposed the Russian military as far less formidable than the Kremlin has portrayed it to be. For a while there was considerable confusion about the wisdom and utility of Ukraine taking some Russian border territory. Experts I trust did not think that Ukraine would hold territory in Kursk for more than perhaps a few weeks in the summer and perhaps into the autumn. And yet here we are. Ukraine has control over much of the territory it captured, has tied up at least some Russian and North Korean troops in Kursk who would have been otherwise sent to Donbas or at the southern front (remember that Russia has not yet achieved full control of the territories it claimed to annex in 2023), and the Kursk invasion has sowed some internal discord in Russia. It turns out that Russian villagers resent being displaced after being promised that the war would not affect them, and that those same villagers resent receiving practically no aid since becoming displaced. News of Russian troops leveling the villages of their own people does nothing to boost morale. And yes, it appears that it will be a massive effort in the spring to finally eject Ukraine from Kursk, and even that is not a guaranteed success for Putin's regime.

The past year has also seen Ukraine become more capable of hitting Russia where it hurts: oil and natural gas storage and refineries. A number of those attacks have occurred well within Russia's borders. As a result, Russia has less fuel available for the war as well as for domestic consumption, and Russia's ability to export its oil, refined fuels, and natural gas has also been hampered. Ukrainian troops have at their disposal more and more modern equipment, including (finally) F-16s. All of that seems to be helping to thwart Russian offensive efforts. 

I would hardly characterize the picture as rosy for Ukraine, but it is a far cry from the early conventional wisdom that Ukraine would fall within a matter of days or weeks in the late winter of 2022. As always, the future is uncertain. Ukrainian troops may be fewer in number, but they are better trained and equipped. As near as I can tell, Ukrainian national unity has held up well, and their President, Volodymir Zelenskyy has remained a well-regarded leader even as his people endure continued hardship. The EU nations have generally remained steadfast in support. The one major card Putin's regime always had with Europe - oil and natural gas, on which the EU was dependent - is no longer a factor. Still, Russia continues to commit atrocities. This war may well be an existential war for Putin's continued grip on power at this juncture, and Putin is best treated much the way one treats a cornered animal. The US elections from 2024 loomed for much of the year. The GOP has increasingly come to embrace the Kremlin's regime and has shown increased hostility toward Ukraine and its leadership. Trump sent some mixed signals during his campaign and for a while afterward, but most rational folks expected Trump to be more aligned with Putin if elected. Recent events have made it clear that Trump is no friend of Ukraine. We've also seen Trump's initial efforts to negotiate the future of Ukraine without actually involving the Ukrainians, much the way Trump negotiated away Afghanistan with the Taliban without including the elected Afghan government in 2020. We saw how that turned out. There is a very real risk that Trump will abandon Ukraine or offer support only after extracting draconian concessions from Ukraine. Since Trump seems to view alliances much akin to protection rackets (which makes sense I guess for a failed and corrupt real estate developer who likely interacted with mafia types during his heyday), expect increasingly shrill and ridiculous demands from Trump to Ukraine. So far, Zelenskyy has been steadfast, as has the parliament (Rada). Any hope that Trump would turn out to be a trusted ally has faded as Trump and his henchmen made clear over the last week or two. Expect more concerted efforts by the US to oust Zelenskyy, since he is clearly viewed as a problem to be eliminated. Expect more and more for Trump and the right-wing media to parrot Russian talking points in their own rhetoric. The accusations by Trump, Musk, and others of their ilk that Zelenskyy is a dictator, has no popular support, and that Ukraine started the current war are ludicrous on their face. But, there is a subset of humanity who will believe it. To his credit, Zelenskyy has called out Trump for making those sorts of accusations and has correctly called out the Trump "deal" regarding Ukraine's minerals for what it is: extortion. Zelenskyy and fellow Ukrainians have also been very steadfast about holding elections in the middle of this war. Those bellowing at Ukraine to hold fresh elections post-haste do so while ignoring Ukraine's constitution. Besides, how would the logistics work? Would Ukrainians who find themselves on the wrong side of the front be able to vote, and if so, would their votes be counted fairly? I guess if the goal is simply to eliminate a threat to a dream of a reconstituted Soviet Union, an invaded nation's constitution is not much of a concern. 

I cannot predict when or how all this will end. Wars, thankfully, do not last indefinitely. They do eventually end. What I can tell you is that in spite of a poorly executed effort by Western allies to supply Ukraine with the supplies and aid it needs, Ukraine continues to stand. People with legitimate expertise in the study of war and in eastern Europe are better positioned to offer an informed opinion than am I. So what can I say? Ukraine probably should start counting out the US as an ally. Although I generally have a favorable view of how Biden supported Ukraine, including providing intel in late 2021 to anyone who would listen regarding what was then an imminent Russian invasion. However, Biden and his team were painfully slow at delivering needed aid to Ukrainians, and the Biden administration was not that great at listening to Ukrainian leaders who arguably knew better what they needed than the US did, or European allies for that matter. I am one of those who in late February 2022 that if NATO forces simply closed the skies over Ukraine, that Russia would lose the war and Ukraine would be left in peace. That was considered "too risky" as Putin tends to threaten to use nukes every time he is cornered. It's an empty threat as we have seen over three years. There was not going to be a Russian escalation to US and allied efforts to use their full force to thwart an invasion. The contention that a more forceful response by the US and NATO would have helped Ukraine end the war in its favor before 2022 was done in hindsight strikes me as much more realistic in hindsight. We can't do anything about the past. There is only now and the future. I have my doubts that Putin will achieve his maximalist objectives, even with Trump's backing.

For those who might remember me from the early days of blogging or on USENET, my approach to the Russo-Ukraine war has arguably been something of a shock. I was after all an anti-war blogger during the aughts. So what changed? Nothing, actually. It turns out that I was far from a doctrinaire pacifist even then. The use of violence should be seen as a last resort, but when there is no choice, it's time to fight. I've been pretty consistent about that, as close personal friends would likely concur. I think the more overarching principle is that I don't approve of invasions against other nations, and tend to view most rationales for invasion to be lies. That was the case with GW Bush's invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq just as it is with Putin's invasion of Ukraine (both the initial invasion in 2014 and then the more recent full-scale invasion since 2022). Nor do I support calls for appeasement of the Russian regime. If history has taught us anything it's that appeasement is for suckers. The sooner we all accept that reality, the better. Better to be a Churchill than a Chamberlain. 

For the leftists out there who parrot Russian talking points, I wish you all would stop. You won't. Realize that most of us see through what you are doing, and no amount of dressing your rhetoric in the language of dialectical materialism, environmentalism, or pacifism will change what you are saying: you wish for millions of people to become subjects of a brutal dictatorship that destroys all it touches. Is that how you want to be remembered? Besides, do you really want to make common cause with the same far-right individuals and groups that you would otherwise find disgusting if you had your wits about you? Again, is that how you want to be remembered? 

The future has yet to be written. I still have reason to hope that Ukrainians will emerge from this war victorious. If so, the credit is all theirs, and Europeans will owe their continued freedom and privilege thanks to the sacrifice of many Ukrainians who met the moment when it arrived.